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Although many contend  that  human  rights  law  is  a  justification  for  intellectual  property 
rights, precisely  the opposite  is  true. Human rights  law  is  far more a  limit on  intellectual 
property  rights  than a  rationale  for  such  regimes.  In a  variety of ways, human  rights  law 
requires  states  to  take  specific,  concrete  steps  to  limit  the  effects  of  intellectual  property 

















rights can affect  the right  to participate  in cultural  life.  In  its General Comment No.  17, 
the  Committee  emphasized  that  states  are  obligated  to  seek  an  appropriate  balance 
between measures  to protect  authors’ moral  and material  interests, which may  include 
the grant of exclusive rights, and rights such as the right to take part in cultural  life.3 A 
new General Comment  interpreting Article  15(1)(a) of  the Covenant provides  a  valuable 
opportunity to articulate measures states may implement to achieve this balance. 
                                                








This  submission  does  not  seek  to  reiterate  arguments  raised  in  connection  with  the 
drafting  of  General  Comment  No.  17.  Instead,  its  goal  is  to  describe,  based  on  well‐
established principles articulated by the Committee in its  jurisprudence, several ways  in 
which  states  may  need  to  limit  domestic  intellectual  property  rights  in  order  to 







life  as well  as  the  very  essence of people’s  culture. As Yvonne Donders has  argued,  the 
meaning  of  cultural  life  “now  represents,  in  accordance  with  the  anthropological 
approach,  a way  of  life  of  individuals  and  communities.”4  Individuals  require  access  to 
cultural goods in order to be able to participate in and create meaning in connection with 
these  ways  of  life.  In  this  sense,  the  ability  “take  part”  in  cultural  life  requires  that 
individuals be able to consume, transform, and share culture. 
 
At  the  same  time,  however,  individuals  and  communities  also  need  control  over  and 
protection of their cultural goods from access by others in order to preserve their way of 












life by  limiting  their  access  to  cultural  goods.6 The  ability  to participate  in  a particular 
                                                
4 Yvonne Donders, Cultural Life in the Context of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/40/13, 9 May 2008, p. 7; 
see  also  ELSA  STAMATOPOULOU,  CULTURAL  RIGHTS  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  ARTICLE  27  OF  THE  UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BEYOND 109 (2007). 
5  See  Rosemary  Coombe,  Cultural  Rights  and  Intellectual  Property  Debates,  Human  Rights  Dialogue: 
“Cultural Rights,” 2(12), pp. 34‐36 (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Spring 2005). 
6 Consistent with the broad understanding of “cultural life” reflected in the Committee’s jurisprudence, see 
Donders,  supra  note  4,  p.  7,  cultural  goods  would  include  not  only  art,  literature,  and music,  but  also 









The  participatory  dimension  of  the  right  to  take  part  in  cultural  life  also  requires  the 
ability  to  share  and  transform  culture.  Individuals  “take  part”  in  cultural  life  as  both 
consumers and creators of culture. Because cultural life is a product of interactions within 
a  community,  the  right  to  participate  in  cultural  life  necessarily  includes  being  able  to 
share cultural goods with others.8 Transformative use is also central to this right. Culture 
does  not  exist  in  a  vacuum  but  rather  develops  and  evolves  as  it  is  shared  and 
transformed,  and  creating  cultural  works  often  involves  building  on  and  transforming 





impair  the  overall  quantity  and  diversity  of  the  cultural  goods  in  the  public  domain. 
Diversity of cultural goods helps to ensure that individuals are able to choose the cultural 
life  in which they participate.9  Incremental  restrictions on cultural  goods  thus  limit  the 






in  cultural  life.  First,  exclusive  rights  can  limit  access  to  cultural  goods. Cultural  goods 
under copyright might be unavailable if the copyright owners decide not to disseminate 
particular works. Copyright can also contribute to a lack of translations of works in less 
widely‐spoken  languages,  if  copyright  owners  do  not  create  such  translations  or  allow 
                                                                                                                                                       
democratization represented by the anthropological understanding of cultural life is thus accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in the quantity and diversity of what we might understand as cultural goods. 








of  General  Individual  Rights  –  Lessons  from  the  International  Human  Rights  Case  Law,  U.N.  Doc. 
E/C.12/40/4, 9 May 2008, pp. 6‐7 (discussing the importance of cultural diversity). 
  4 
them  to  be  created  by  others.10  Works  may  also  be  geographically  inaccessible  if 
publishers or authors decide not to allow their distribution in particular countries. 
 
Further, access might be  limited  if authors  take advantage of exclusive rights  to charge 
prices  that make  the works  unaffordable  and  thus  effectively  unavailable.  For  example, 
copyright allows publishers to charge prices for textbooks that may be difficult for many 
consumers to pay.11 Access to educational materials such as textbooks affects not only an 
individual’s  right  to  education,  but  also  his  or  her  ability  to meaningfully  take  part  in 
cultural life. 
 
Access  can also become prohibitively  expensive  if  users  are  required  to obtain multiple 
licenses  in order  to use a particular work.12 One commentator noted,  for example,  that 
the difficulty of navigating multiple sets of ownership rights and the  threat of  litigation 
was  likely  to discourage houses of worship  in  the United States  from using copyrighted 
materials  during  services.13  The  author  explained  that  most  houses  of  worship  cannot 
afford  the high cost of negotiating  license  fees or defending against copyright  litigation 





a  significant  impact on  the  ability of  individuals  to  share  and engage  in  transformative 
use. For example, some states have enacted laws that impose criminal or civil liability on 
acts that circumvent technological measures that limit the uses that individuals can make 




“Tackling  the  Negative  Impacts  of  Intellectual  Property  Systems:  A  Human  Rights  Approach,”  13  March 
2008 (noting that publishers obtain returns of up  to 200% on textbooks in specialized fields), available at 








states  that have  ratified  the Covenant and  from developing countries  in  particular are  difficult  to  obtain, 
reflecting an urgent need for states to set benchmarks and monitor the way in which intellectual property 
rights are affecting the right to participate in cultural life. See General Comment No. 1, Reporting by States 
parties,  U.N.  Doc.  E/1989/22,  24  February  1989,  ¶  3.  Examples  are  also  difficult  to  obtain  because  legal 
reforms  that  introduced  stronger  intellectual  property  rights  in many  countries  were  implemented  only 
relatively  recently.  The Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights,  for example, 
allowed  developing  countries  until  January  1,  2000  to  comply  with  its  provisions.  Agreement  on  Trade‐




of  particular  cultural  works.15  These  laws  may  prohibit  circumvention  even  when  the 
purpose  of  the  circumvention  is  to  enable  a  lawful  use.  A  teacher,  for  example, might 







which  digital  content  can  be  distributed  via  information  and  communication 
technologies. As  the Office of  the High Commissioner  for Human Rights has observed, 
information  and  communication  technologies  can  be  used  to,  among  other  things, 
“advance cultural diversity and multilingualism through the creation and dissemination 
of  local  contents  and  cultures.”16  Distance  education  programs,  the  widespread  use  of 
mobile phones, and access to the Internet all contribute to the increasing availability of 
cultural  content.  The  overly  restrictive  enforcement  of  copyright  in  digital  works  thus 






imposed  by  intellectual  property  laws.  Under  appropriate  conditions,  states  might  use 
compulsory licensing to increase access to particular goods. States may also take steps in 










such  as  exceptions  for  speeches,  education,  reporting,  parody,  and  quotations,  among 
many others. Such exceptions and limitations can be critical in ensuring that individuals 
                                                
15 Anti‐circumvention laws are required under the WIPO Copyright Treaty and have been implemented in 
the  European  Union,  Japan,  Australia,  and  the  United  States.  See  generally  June  M.  Besek,  Anti‐
Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report  from the Kernochan, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385 (2004). Anti‐
circumvention provisions have also been included in free trade agreements  the United States has entered 










not  be  appropriate  in  another.  Although  it  may  not  be  possible  to  specify  how  states 
should  implement  this  balance,  intellectual  property  laws  should  nonetheless  avoid 
unreasonably  restricting  access  to  cultural  goods.  It  is  also  important  for  states  to 
implement and ensure the continued existence of provisions in their domestic intellectual 
property laws that allow consumers to use, transform, and share cultural goods. Examples 
might  include  compulsory  licensing,  limits  on  the  scope  of  exclusive  rights,  and 
exceptions and limitations to copyright. 
 
Finally,  the  adequate  enforcement  of  such  provisions,  exceptions,  and  limitations  is 
critical.  Even  states  that  allow  compulsory  licensing  in  their  domestic  law  may  be 
reluctant  to  rely  on  such  a  provision  for  fear  of  adverse  reactions  from  other  states.18 
Concern about negative consequences associated with the use of flexibilities guaranteed 
under  domestic  law  may  prevent  states  from  taking  necessary  steps  to  protect  those 
within  their  jurisdiction. Further,  failure  to enforce exceptions under domestic  law may 
have a chilling effect on individual consumers and creators. States should ensure that the 





Intellectual property rights continue to  increase  in strength under  the domestic  laws of 
many  states  around  the  world.  Stronger  copyright  laws  may  be  impermissibly 
retrogressive  if  they  result  in  decreased  protection  of  human  rights.  As  the Committee 
has emphasized, the requirement of progressive realization means that states must “move 
as expeditiously and effectively as possible” toward the goal of full realization of the rights 
protected  under  the  Covenant,  and  “any  deliberately  retrogressive  measures  in  that 
regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified 
                                                
17 For an extensive discussion of the way in which states might limit intellectual property rights in ways that 
protect  creative  freedom,  see  P.  Bernt  Hugenholtz  &  Ruth  L.  Okediji,  Conceiving  an  International 
Instrument  on  Limitations  and  Exceptions  to  Copyright,  Final  Report,  pp.  11‐16,  6  March  2008.  As 
Hugenholtz & Okediji explain, “appropriately designed L&E’s [limitations and exceptions] may alleviate the 
needs of people around the world who still lack access to books and other educational materials.” Id. p. 11. 








Increases  in  intellectual  property  rights  may  be  accompanied  by  decreases  in  the 
protections afforded the right to participate in cultural life, as fewer cultural goods enter 
the  public  domain  or  goods  become  less  accessible.  As  a  result,  states  contemplating 
measures  to  strengthen  intellectual  property  rights  in  ways  that  restrict  individuals’ 
ability  to  take  part  in  cultural  life  should  give  such  measures  the  most  careful 
consideration  and  justify  them  by  reference  to  their  existing  obligations  under  the 
Covenant.  For  example,  states  contemplating  the  extension  of  copyright  terms  under 
domestic  law  would  be  required  to  demonstrate  either  that  the  extension  will  not 





The  Committee  has  already  emphasized  the  importance  of  protecting  the  underlying 
determinants  of  rights  and  strictly  justifying  retrogressive  measures.  In  the  context  of 
intellectual property, these principles mean that states may be required to take steps to 
protect access  to cultural goods and the ability  to engage  in  transformative use, and to 
proceed  carefully  where  domestic  legal  reforms would  limit  these  capacities.  Applying 





                                                
19 General Comment No. 3, The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, 14 
December 1990, ¶ 9. 
